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FINDLAY'; JAMES C. LIT:TL and 
SARAH D. LITTLE, his 'vife; MARY~~ ,, 19 1961 
1\l. LITTLE; l{A Y LITTLE; a single 
rnan; \TAL LITTLE and \TIY'IAN -l'l.- - , pre~-~---(;"~~~::··ut~h-----
LITTLE, his "'"ife, EMMA LIT'TLE ; 
NIELS LITTLE, a single man, and 
F~\Y ALVEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFEN'DANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
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151 North Main Richfield, Utah 
Attorneys for Mary M. Little; Kay 
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Attorneys for Duncan Findlay 
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IN THE SUPREME CO~U·RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOliN YARDLEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
MAX S\\'"APP, Executor of the Estate 
of ~lelvin s"~app, deceased; DUNCAN 
F l~DLA \'"; JAMES C. LIT'TLE and 
SARAH D. LITTLE, his wife; MARY 
~1. LITTLE ; KAY LITTLE; a single 
n1an; , ... AL LITTLE and VIVIAN H. 
LITTLE, his wife, EMMA LlT'TLE; 
NIELS LITTLE, a single man, and 
F..:\Y ALVEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9379 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATE~IENT OF F A~CTS 
For all purposes in the instant Brief, the parties will 
be referred to and page references to the transcript of 
the trial will be made in the same manner and by the 
same designations as those adopted and used in the 
Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant. However, it should be 
noted that Respondents herein include Max Swapp, Exe-
cutor of the Estate of Melvin Swapp·, deceased; Duncan 
Findlay; i\fary ~I. Little; Kay Little, a single man; and 
,~ al Little and -v·ivian H. Little, his wife. The remaining 
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Defendants (James C. Little and Sarah D. L~ttle, his 
wife; Emma Little; Niels Little, a single man; and Fay 
Alvey) claim no interest in the water rights and pro-
perties involved and so stated in their Answer to Plain-
tiff's Complaint. 
Respondents disagree 'vith certain statements made 
hy Appellant in the Statement of Facts contained in his 
Brief and also call attention as follo,vs to various facts 
not recited in Appellant's Brief: 
1. Littles' land is traversed by both Castle Creek 
and Minnie or Little ·Creek. \Vhile it is correct that part 
of it can be watered only from Castle Creek and another 
part only from the commingled waters of both Creeks, it 
is also true that another part of Littles' land is east of 
Minnie or Little Creek and can be watered only from 
Minnie Creek ( T. 183, 185, 196, 267-269). 
2. At page 3 of Plaintiff's Brief, he refers to a single 
diversion used by him, whereas the transcript shows he 
has five diversions, at least four of 'vhich "~ere installed 
and constructed by him during or after the year 1929 
(T. 69-72, 113-115). 
3. Plaintiff's lands are traversed only by Minnie or 
Little Creek and can be watered only by means of diver-
sions from said Creek. They are located a substantial 
distance from and below the confluence of Minnie or 
Little and Castle 'Creeks (T. 126-127). 
4. Over Respondents' objections and without proper 
foundation, the "Morse Decree" and the "Cox Decree" 
were admitted in evidence (T. 298-300). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
Plaintiff failed to establish that the parties to "rhom 
"·pre purportedly a\varded the \\~aters of "Castle or 
~I in niP CrePk'' in the •. n(orse Decree" and those pur-
portedly a\varded by the "'Cox Decree" the waters of 
.. Ca~tle and ~Iinnie or Little Creeks, and out of spring 
areas tributary to sai(l creeks during the entire year" 
\vere actually parties to the actions in \Yhich said Decrees 
\rere made. 
5. Respondents deny that \\rith the help of the State 
Engineer or other\\rise any program was worked out 
\\rhereh:~ the parties took the \Yater on turns. The trans-
cript sho\\~s that the Sevier River Commissioner merely 
n1ade inspections and examinations, but did not divide 
or purport to divide the \Vater or to fix turns or to \vork 
out any progran1 of taking \Vater on turns ( T. 272'-273). 
R.espondents deny that any turn system \vas ever worked 
out by any means (T. 273). 
6. \V.hatever rights the parties have in and to the 
'vaterf-: of each and both of said ·Creeks are diligence 
rights~ based 'On physical appropriation and use prior to 
~fay 12, 1903, when Chapter 100 of the Laws of Utah, 
1903, became effective, and no rights have been acquired 
by appropriation since then through the State Engineer's 
Office (T. 8-9). At no time or place did Plaintiff establish 
any use of any water on his lands prior to 1904, 1905, or 
1906. Any irrigation use made on his lands prior to 1927 
was shown to be by means of one dive-rsion for one year 
only (in 1904, 1905, or 1906) from Minnie Creek for some-
thing between 5 acres and 30 acres of 'Oats (T. 34, 36, 63-
64). 
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7. As a downstream user, Plaintiff has added several 
diversions, at least four, since 1919 when ho took over 
the property he now operates, ( T. 113-115) and has put 
under irrigation substantial acreages, but 'vhen he can1e 
on to the property it was almost entirely a sheep-bed and 
"had been tramped to death by sheep" and no irrigation 
or farming 'vas being conducted. (T. 118-119). 
8. The "Cox Decree" admitted in evidence provides 
on page 230 thereof as follo,vs : 
"IT IS FlTRTHER ORDERED, ADJf~DGED 
and DECREED that, except as herein otherwise 
specifically provided, all 'va ter shall be measured 
to the o'vners and users thereof as of their re-
spective dates of priority, s·o that each user or 
owner of the waters herein decreed shall be as-
sured that his right will be satisfied in full before 
any subsequent appropriators shall receive any 
water whatever; .... " 
Plaintiff not only failed to establish any use prior 
to 190-i and established only a linlited one-season use 
be~t,veen then and 1927 ( T. 22-23, 63-64) but he failed to 
establish any priorities of any kind as bet,veen himself 
and the Respondents or any of them or in connection 
with the rights of any parties to the instant action. 
Respondents disagree with Appellant's contention 
that the evidence is now to be reviewed in the light most 
favorable to him. On the contrary, such evidence is no'v 
to be reviewed in the light most favorable to Respondents, 
they having prevailed in the trial court. The case of 
Martin v. Steve'nS, 121 Utah 485, 2±3 P. 2nd 747, cited by 
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Respondent in his Brief, is not applicable to 'our situation, 
that having been a jury case. 
Throughout the instant Brief, certain matters have 
been italicized by us for purposes of emphasis. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT N·O. I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S CASE FOR 'THE REASONS CITED BY AP-
PELLANT AND PLAINTIFF IN HIS BRIEF OR FOR ANY 
OTHER REASONS WHATSOEVER: 
(A) THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COX DECREE" PUR-
PORTING TO AWARD ALL OF THE FLOW OF 
MINNIE AND CASTLE CREEKS ·TO PLAINTIFF 
AND THREE O·THER PERSONS DID NO·T EST AB-
LlSH A PRIMA FACIE RIGHT IN PLAINTIFF 
TO AT LEAST ONE-FOURTH OR ANY O'THER 
PARTICULAR FRACTIONAL PART OF THE 
TOTAL FLOW OF SAID STREAMS. 
(B) THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COX DECREE" RE-
FERRED TO IN (A) ABOVE DID NOT REQUIRE 
THE COURT TO PROCEED TO DEFINE AND 
CLARIFY PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMED RIGHT IF 
THE SAME BE MORE O·R LESS THAN ONE-
FOURTH OF THE TO·TAL FLOW OF THE 
STREAMS INVO·LVED, AND DID NOT RELIEVE 
PLAINTIFF FROM ESTABLISHING THE PRIOR-
ITY, NA'TURE, EXTENT, AND MEASURE OF HIS 
CLAIMED RIGHT AND THE COMPARATIVE AND 
RESPECTVE PRIORITIES OF THE CLAIMED 
RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENTS. 
(C) RESPONDENTS AGREE ·THAT NO ENLARGE-
MENT OF DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS CAN BE 
RECOGNIZED AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE 
"COX DECREE" IN NOVEMBER, 1936, NOR, FOR 
THAT MATTER, AFTER MAY 12, 1903, BUT CON-
TEND THAT SUCH FACT OR RULE HAS NO 
BEARING ON ANY MATTERS BEFORE THE 
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COURT AND DID NOT RELIEVE PLAIN·TIFF 
FROM ESTABLISHING BY EVIDENCE THE 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF HIS OWN CASE, 
WHICH HE FAILED TO DO. 
ARGU~fENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF 
PLAIN'TIFF'S CASE FOR ·THE REASONS CITED BY AP-
PELLANT AND PLAINTIFF IN HIS BRIEF OR FOR ANY 
O'THER REASO·NS WHATSOEVER: 
(A) THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COX DECREE" PUR-
PORTING TO AWARD ALL OF THE FLOW OF 
MINNIE AND CASTLE CREEKS TO PLAINTIFF 
AND THREE O:THER PERSONS DID NOT ESTAB-
LISH A PRIMA FACIE RIGHT IN PLAINTIFF 
TO AT LEAST ONE-FOURTH OR ANY OTHER 
PARTICULAR FRACTIONAL PART OF THE 
TOTAL FLOW OF SAID STREAMS. 
By Appellant's Point No. 1 (A), he urges that the 
Court erred in granting Defendants' ~lotion to Disn1iss 
because the provisions of the '~Cox Decree" giving all of 
the flow of l\{innie and Castle Creeks to Plaintiff and 
three other persons established a prima facie right in 
Plaintiff to at least one-fourth of the total flo"'" of said 
streams. Plaintiff concludes that the wording of said 
Decree, at page 18 thereof, makes each of the four per-
sons named, to-wit, Blanche Showalter, 1\{. ·C. Swapp, 
James A. Little and John Yardley, the owners of an un-
divided one-fourth interest in the said Creeks and is 
analogous of a situation \Yhere property is granted or 
conveyed to two or more individuals. In support of said 
conclusion and contention, Plaintiff cities Section 78-1-5, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, which was in effect 'vhen 
the "Cox Decree" was entered and which states that a 
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grant of real estate to t'v-o or more persons in their own 
right ~hall be a tenancy in common unless expressly de-
elared other,vise. Several case and text book citations 
are given to the effect that a presumption exists that 
realty eonvPyed to two or more persons is owned by them 
in co-tenancy and as equal undivided owners. 
It i~ signifieant to note, however, that all of the 
authorities cited by Plaintiff are confined to '~grants", 
•·tran~f~rs", H deeds", and "conveyances." Chapter 1 of 
'ritle 78 of the Revised Statutes of r: tah, 1933, deals with 
conveyances of real estate. Section 78-1-1, Revised Sta-
tutes of [Ttah, 1933, ""hich is now Section 57-1-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, reads: 
"57 -1-1. Conveyance defined.- The term 
"conveyance" as used in this title shall be con-
strued to embrace every instrument in writing by 
which any real estate, or interest in real estate, is 
created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or as-
signed, except Wills, and leases for a term not 
exceeding one year." 
Consequently, when Section 78-1-5, Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1933, stated that a Grant of an interest to two 
or 1nore persons created a tenancy in common it referred 
to a "grant" or "conveyance" of real estate by an instru-
ment in which real estate or an interest therein was 
created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned. 
Certainly, it cannot be contended that water rights or 
interests in water rights, even if considered to be real 
estate, can be "created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered 
or assigned" by a Decree of the ·Court. A Decree ad-
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judicating "\Vater rights merely determines existing 
ownerships and does not create, alien, mortgage, en-
cumber, assign, eonvey, grant or transfer water rights 
or anything else. 
The Respondent fails to cite a single case holding 
that a Decree adjudicating and determining that several 
persons are the owners of certain "\Vater rights makes 
them tenants in common, and more particularly, makes 
them equal owners. 
The "Cox Decree" itself provides the ans"\ver when 
it says on page 230 thereof that unless otherwise specific-
ally provided, all waters referred to in the Decree "shall 
be measured to the owners and users thereof as of their 
respective dates of priority, so that each user or owner 
of the waters herein decreed shall be assured that his 
right will be satisfied in full before any subsequent ap-
propriators shall receive any 'vater whatever." 
Bacon vs. Plain City Irrigation Co., 87 Utah 564, 52 
P. 2nd, 427 ( 1935) holds that the relative date of 
priority of a water right is as much a part of an estab-
lished water right as is the number of second feet covered 
by it. Certainly, if Plaintiff had any water right at all, 
then his relative· date of priority was part of his case 
and it was up to him to establish that, whieh he failed to 
do. 
The case of Deseret vs. HooppvaniJa, 66 lTtah 25, 239 
P. 479, set forth clearly the rule of principle of law that 
he who is first in time was first in right. 'Consequently, 
it was the Plaintiff's duty to establish who was first in 
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ti1ne and therPby became first in right, for how much 
\Vater, the respective priorities, acreages and uses. 
(B) THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COX DECREE" RE-
FERRED TO IN (A) ABOVE DID NOT REQUIRE 
THE COURT TO PROCEED TO DEFINE AND 
CLARIFY PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMED RIGHT IF 
'THE SAME BE MORE O·R LESS THAN ONE-
FOURTH OF THE TOTAL FLOW OF THE 
STREAMS INVOLVED, AND DID NOT RELIEVE 
PLAINTIFF FROM ESTABLISHING THE PRIOR-
ITY, NA'TURE, EXTENT, AND MEASURE OF HIS 
CLAIMED RIGHT AND THE COMPARATIVE AND 
RESPECTVE PRIORITIES OF THE CLAIMED 
RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENTS. 
Plaintiff next contends that the provisions of the 
.. Cox Decree" specifying a water right to Plaintiff in 
~linnie and Castle ·Creeks required the court to proceed 
to define and clarify that right if the same be more or 
less than one-fourth of the total flow of the streams. 
Here again, Plaintiff's argument is fatally defective in 
that he failed to show any water right in either Minnie 
or Castle Creeks because he admitted that if he had any-
thing at all, it was a diligence right. Despite this, he 
sho"'"ed no use prior to 1904, 1905 or 1906 and therefore 
failed to show any rights whatever. Furthermore, the 
court is not "required" to proceed and define anything 
in such a case as this. It is UP' to the Plaintiff to introduce 
evidence which establishes a right in himself, the priority, 
nature, quantity and extent thereof, the rights and prior-
ities of those he is suing, and that they have deprived him 
of water to which he is entitled. The court cannot "pro-
ceed to define and clarify" anything in the absence of 
proof which establishes a prima facie case and establishes 
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that Plaintiff has so1ne right to the relief he is seeking. 
That is the exact reason for Rule 41 (b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Proeedure, which provides as follo\vs: 
" .... After the plaintiff has completed the 
presentation of his evidence, the defendant, with-
out waiving his right to offer evidence in the 
event the motion is not granted, may move for 
a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and 
the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief 
" 
Furthermore, the Plaintiff did not establish that 
anything the Defendants have done or have not done 
has resulted in less water being available to Plaintiff 
than would have been obtainable by him other\vise. 
Plaintiff insists that there is need for the Supreme 
Court of Utah to determine for the benefit of the District 
'Court whether the ti1ne to be used in deter1nining and 
fixing the rights of the parties "Tould be the use 1nade 
of the waters in 1936 when the "Cox Decree" \Yas entered 
or 1906 when the ''J.\!Iorse Decree" \Yas entered. He con-
veniently ignores the crucial point \Yhich is 1903 and prior 
thereto when the measure and extent of diligence rights 
were determined and after "Thich no one could increase 
his water rights by physical appropriation and use. 
See Chapter 100, Laws of Utah, 1903; and J en.sen v. 
Birch Creek Ranch, 76 Utah 356, 289 P. 1097 (1930), 
which holds relative to the application of Chapter 100 
of Laws of Utah, 1903, that after ~lay 12, 1903, the effec-
tive date of said Chapter, appropriation could only be 
accomplished by application through the State Engineer's 
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()ffieP, but prior thereto a prior appropriator could ac-
quire "Tater by u~P, but could not increase his demand 
after that date and his use of the 'vater so as to deprive 
a junior appropriator of any right which he may have 
acquired before the increase of use by the prior appro-
priator. 
Plaintiff cites the prayer of his complaint and states 
that it asks judgment for the court to clarify and specify 
'rith ~pecific verbiage the provisions of the Cox Decree 
1nentioned in this complaint. However, certainly Plain-
tiff is not contending that the prayer of his Complaint 
"i.ll supply fatal defects and omissions in proof. It is 
up to the Plaintiff to supply evidence which would en-
title hin1 to have any such judgment. This he failed to 
rlo. Plaintiff 'vould have the Defendants saddled 'vith 
the burden of going forward, having once introduced the 
HCox Decree,'' and of proving Plaintiff's case. This the 
Defendants are not required to do. For the purposes of 
this litigation, Defendants need not state that they 'vere 
or 'vere not parties to the "Cox Decree" action. That 
'\?as part of Plaintiff's burden to establish. Even if they 
'vere parties, there were no presumptions. Where the 
"rater "'"as purportedly awarded to four persons, it was 
then up to one bringing a matter into court to establish 
his priority date and the respective priority dates of 
those he 'vas suing. In our case the priority date estab-
lished by Plaintiff proved by his own evidence that he 
did not even own a right in either Creek, that he could 
not irrigate from one Creek at all, and that the first use 
out of Minnie or Little Creek, made by anyone whom-
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soever on Plaintiff's presently owned lands was after 
1903, which would mean that Plaintiff has no right. By 
his own testimony and the evidence he introduced he 
failed to establish in himself either a diligence right ac-
quired before May 12, 1903, or an appropriated right 
acquired by application after that date. 
(C) RESPONDENTS AGREE 'THAT NO ENLARGE-
MENT OF DEFENDAN'TS' RIGHTS CAN BE 
RECOGNIZED AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE 
"COX DECREE" IN NO·VEMBER, 1936, NOR, FOR 
'THAT MATTER, AFTER MAY 12, 1903, BUT CON-
TEND THAT SUCH FACT OR RULE HAS NO 
BEARING ON ANY MATTERS BEFORE THE 
COURT AND DID NOT RELIEVE PLAIN·TIFF 
FROM ESTABLISHING BY EVIDENCE THE 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF HIS OWN CASE, 
WHICH HE FAILED TO DO. 
Plaintiff next contends that no enlargement of De-
fendants' rights can be recognized after the entry of the 
"Cox Decree'' in November, 1936. This may be admitted, 
but we fail to see where it has any bearing on Plaintiff's 
failure to establish a prima facie case or to establish 
facts showing that he was entitled to any relief or judg-
ment whatsoever. 
The fact that John Yardley testified that he irrigated 
125 acres in 1936 and 140 acres from 1936 through 1949 
is meaningless. If sufficient water came down to him, 
he had a right to use the same, unless, possibly, down-
stream users made a complaint about his having added 
at least four new ditches and diversions and very sub-
stantial acreages under irrigation to which he was not 
entitled. Those years were admittedly wet years, when 
everyone had all the water he wanted. That does not 
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P~tablish that Plaintiff had any rights in the Creeks or 
the quantity, priority and extent of any rights he might 
r.laim, nor doP~ it establish that during the last ten or 
PleYPn drought years, any actions on the part of the 
Defendants have deprived Plaintiff of water to which 
he ""as entitled, if any. 
Defendants agree that \vithout a proper filing and 
approval, there could be no extension of water rights 
~ince 1936 or for that matter since 1903, except that prior 
to 1939 upstrean1 parties could acquire from others by 
adverse possession and use already-appropriated rights. 
1-[o" .. PYPr, ,\ .. e are confronted "\Yith diligence rights, and 
Plaintiff, as a downstream users, must rely on 1903 and 
prior thereto to establish the measure, extent, acreage, 
point of diversion, use and quantity of water to which 
he is entitled, in all of " .. hich respects he failed. Further-
more, as admitted by his brief, he could not expand his 
rights by adverse possession after 1939. Furthermore, 
as a downstream user, he could not at any tifme "·adverse" 
anyone above hinl, namely, Respondents herein. 
Is Plaintiff now contending that by virtue of use 
made from 1927 to 1939, he has acquired a title to some 
"Tater rights by adverse use and possession~ If that is 
his contention, the answer is that he cannot succeed be-
cause he 'vas at all times a downstream user. 
In W ellst·ille East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay 
Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P. 2d 634 (1943) 
it is stated that the general rule is that adverse use will 
not "run up stream" and that in a situation in which the 
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use of the water is made by one \vhose point of diversion 
is located below the headgate of another, such use will 
seldom be adverse to the upstream claimant. This san1e 
case held that title to water could be acquired by adverse 
use bet,veen 1903 and 1939, given all the required ele-
ments, namely, seven years of continuous, uninterrupted, 
hostile, notorious, and adverse use, under claim of title 
exclusive of any other right, but in Smith v. Sanders, 11~ 
Utah 517, 189 P. 2d 701 (1948) the Court indicated that 
Section 100-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, enacted in 
1939, prohibited anyone from acquiring a right to the 
use of 'vater by adYerse possession after the enactment 
of that Statute. 
The case of Francis v. RobeJrts, 73 Utah 98, 272 P. 
633 (1928) involved a situation ''There Defendant's lands 
were mainly meadow and pasture and 'Yere higher in 
elevation than Plaintiff's lands, so that the waste or 
surplus "Tater from the irrigation of the Defendant's 
lands naturally flowed down to Plaintiff's lands. The 
Court held that Plaintiff had failed to show that his use 
of the water 'vas adverse and hostile to the use by the 
Defendants, since no hostility to or denial of the right of 
the owners of the upper lands to use the 'Yater "rhenever 
they desired had been established. 
On the question of adverse possession, if Plaintiff is 
relying thereon in view of his failure to establish any 
right by appropriation, either before, during or after 
1903, by the legal means applicable at any particular time, 
it is fundamental that the presumptions are against the 
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aequi~ition of title by adverse use, and that to constitute 
~u<'h use the po~~()ssion 1nust be actual, continuous, hostile 
to the real owner, and 1nanifest from the nature of the 
<'i retunstan('rs so that the O\vner may be i'nformed of it. 
X o ~uch sho\ving has been or can be made in the case 
before the Court. See Center Creek Water and Irrigation 
Co. vs. ,Jan1es Lindsay, 21 lTtah 192, 60 P. 559, and 
Clark vs. North Cottonu,ood Irrigation & Water Co., 79 
Utah 425, 11 P. 2d 300. 
SU~f~1ARY 
It is a matter of established law in the State of r~tah 
that the prior appropriator of \Vaters for beneficial use 
has a better right to \Vaters than any subsequent appro-
priator. Brady v. lJf cGonagle, State Engineer, 57 Utah 
-!2-t, 193 P. 188. Consequently, it must follow that when 
a Plaintiff alleges that someone else has deprived him 
of \Vater, the said Plaintiff 1nust establish both his right 
and his priority, neither of which was done in the instant 
case. There \Vas a complete failure of proof. The· situa. 
tion is similar to that which confronted the Court in Lost 
Creek Irrigation Company vs. Rex, Jennings, and Jen-
nings, 26 "Ctah 485, 73 P. 660 (1903) which was an action 
to quiet title to water rights. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that the lower court was in error in awarding each 
party half of the waters in the creek in question after 
June 15 of each year and the Defendant the high and 
surplus \Yaters prior to that date, because such court 
could not determine from the evidence what each party 
was entitled to. There was no evidence showing the 
amount of water necessary for the use of the parties, but 
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nevertheless the trial court made a finding that Plaintiff 
and Defendant each had diverted and used one-half of the 
normal flow. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that this was not sustained by the evidence and that the 
Plaintiff, having failed to prove by evidence his title to 
any definite amount of water, should have been non-
suited. 
The action of the lower Court in the instant case in 
dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint at the conclusion of his 
case on the ground that upon the facts and the la'v Plain-
tiff had shown no right to relief was correct and should 
be sustained and affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & ~IATTSSON 
Attorneys for the Defendants Little, 
151 N. Main, Richfield, Utah; 
OLSEN & CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorneys for the Defendant 
Duncan Findlay 
76 So. ~fain, Richfield, Utah; 
and 
PICKETT & PICKETT 
Attorneys for the Defendant, Max 
Swapp, as Administrator of the Estate 
of M. W. Swapp, deceased, Pickett Bldg., 
St. George, Utah 
By ---~~---'lll~ 
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